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ABSTRACT: Corporate investment decisions require managers to forecast expected future cash 
flows from potential investments. Although these forecasts are a critical component of successful 
investing, they are not directly observable by external stakeholders. In this study, we investigate 
whether the quality of managers’ externally reported earnings forecasts can be used to infer the 
quality of their corporate investment decisions. Relying on the intuition that managers draw on 
similar skills when generating external earnings forecasts and internal payoff forecasts for their 
investment decisions, we predict that managers with higher quality external earnings forecasts 
make better investment decisions. Consistent with our prediction, we find that forecasting quality 
is positively associated with the quality of both acquisition and capital expenditure decisions. 
Our evidence suggests that externally observed forecasting quality can be used to infer the 
quality of capital budgeting decisions within firms. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Capital budgeting is one of the most fundamental and important responsibilities of firm 
management. A key determinant of successful investment is management’s ability to forecast 
project payoffs, because forecasting plays a central role in investment valuation methods (e.g., 
net present value [NPV] calculations, forward-looking price/earnings multiple or other 
discounted cash flow analyses). Although these forecasts are a critical component of firm health, 
most forecasts are internal and thus not directly observable by external stakeholders. However, 
we expect that management’s forecasting ability used to generate internal project payoff 
forecasts may transfer to other managerial tasks that involve forecasting, such as providing 
external management earnings forecasts. For this specific type of managerial forecast, the 
properties are readily observable. Thus, these voluntarily disclosed earnings forecasts may be 
valuable to external stakeholders not only because they provide management’s expectations of 
next period earnings, but also because they reveal information about managers’ knowledge of the 
firm’s economic environment and their ability to forecast future business prospects, a major 
component in the investment decision process (Trueman 1986). 
This paper investigates whether the quality of voluntarily disclosed management 
forecasts can be used to predict the quality of managerial investment decisions. Although prior 
research views earnings guidance and capital budgeting as distinct tasks, we argue that both tasks 
depend on a common trait—forecasting ability.1 For example, when conducting a corporate 
acquisition, managers often begin by making earnings forecasts to assess the intrinsic value of 
the potential target (Eccles, Lanes, and Wilson 1999; Cullinan, Le Roux, and Weddigen 2004). 
Similarly, managers must predict future project payoffs when selecting among potential capital 
expenditure projects (Graham and Harvey 2001). These forecasts require managers to understand 
                                                 
1 In this study, forecasting ability is comprised of management’s ability to: (1) collect high quality information 
regarding both internal operations (e.g., cost reports, margins, personnel) and the external environment (e.g., 
competition, industry trends, product demand); and (2) process and synthesize this information, which is a function 
of experience and innate talent, to develop accurate forecasts. We provide more detail in Section II. 
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the economic environment as well as their competitive position within the environment. This 
same understanding is needed when providing earnings guidance as well, because earnings are 
essentially the aggregate payoff from past investments. Thus, the quality of managers’ earnings 
forecasts is potentially an observable signal of their broader forecasting ability. 
Although forecasting future project payoffs is an important part of investment decision-
making, a priori, it is unclear whether we can empirically find a relation between external 
management forecasts and managerial investment decisions. First, the quality of a manager’s 
external forecasts may not be a good measure of internal forecasting ability, since providing 
guidance could encourage managers to engage in earnings management, possibly through 
suboptimal investment decisions, so their forecasts appear more accurate (Kasznik 1999; 
Roychowdhury 2006). Second, the quality of external forecasts may measure only short-term 
earnings forecasting ability. Thus, it may not be associated with the long-term forecasting skills 
required for successful capital budgeting. 
To test our hypothesis, we examine the relation between management forecasting quality 
and the quality of subsequent investments using both investments in other companies (corporate 
acquisitions) and investments in fixed assets (capital expenditures).2 We begin by examining the 
relation between management forecasting quality and the quality of subsequent acquisition 
decisions. We proxy for the quality of acquisition decisions using (i) the stock price reaction to 
acquisition announcements (Jensen and Ruback 1983; Masulis, Wang, and Xie 2007; Francis and 
Martin 2010), (ii) post-acquisition changes in operating performance (Healy, Palepu, and Ruback 
1992), (iii) the probability and magnitude of post-acquisition goodwill write-downs (Gu and Lev 
                                                 
2 We examine both types of investments because they offer unique advantages that complement each other. We 
examine acquisitions because they are large, high profile corporate events, with publicly available information, such 
as the exact investment date and specific investment characteristics that we can use in our analyses to provide more 
robust evidence. In contrast, much less information is publicly available about capital expenditure projects. 
However, as compared to acquisitions, capital expenditures are less complex investment transactions that do not 
involve external parties such as investment bankers. As such, forecasting ability and investment valuation may be 
more directly attributable to managers in a capital expenditure setting. We discuss the role of forecasting ability in 
both types of investment in Section II. 
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2011), and (iv) the probability of a post-acquisition divestiture (Francis and Martin 2010). 
Acquisition announcement returns serve as an ex ante measure of the quality of the acquisition 
decision and the remaining three measures serve as ex post measures of acquisition performance. 
We use the pre-acquisition three-year average accuracy of managers’ external earnings forecasts 
as our measure of forecasting quality.  
We find that forecasting accuracy is positively associated with acquisition announcement 
returns and post-acquisition operating performance, and negatively associated with the 
probability and magnitude of post-acquisition goodwill impairments and the probability of post-
acquisition divestitures. These results suggest that firms providing high quality management 
forecasts make better acquisition decisions. Our inferences are robust to controlling for a number 
of alternative explanations related to (i) uncertainty in the overall economic environment driving 
both forecasting accuracy and investment quality, (ii) agency problems that lead to opaque 
disclosures and inefficient investment, (iii) higher financial statement quality and disclosure 
quality reducing financing constraints, and thus increasing investment efficiency, and (iv) self-
selection associated with managers voluntarily providing earnings forecasts. 
Next, we examine whether the relation between management forecasting accuracy and 
acquisition quality is weaker in settings where managerial forecasting ability may not fully 
extend to the valuation of other firms. Specifically, we argue that managers’ forecasting ability 
extends more easily to firms operating in the same industry and firms with similar earnings 
generating processes. Since investment appraisal involves management’s ability to acquire and 
process information about industry- and economy-wide prospects, managers can use, or transfer, 
this knowledge to more effectively aid the valuation of (i) firms in the acquirer’s industry, and 
(ii) firms that have similar earnings generating processes. Consistent with this argument, we find 
that management forecast quality is more strongly associated with acquisition announcement 
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returns when the target operates in the same industry and when the target has a similar earnings 
generating process, as measured by comovement is prior stock returns. 
To provide further support for our prediction and corroborate the evidence documented 
using acquisitions, we examine the association between forecasting accuracy and investment 
efficiency using capital expenditures as a measure of investment. Investment inefficiency is 
defined as investment that differs from the amount that would be predicted given the firm’s 
investment opportunities (Brennan 2003). Following a long list of prior studies, we measure 
investment efficiency as the magnitude of the deviation of actual investment from the expected level 
of investment given the firm’s investment opportunities.3 Consistent with our prediction, we find that 
firms providing more accurate forecasts invest more efficiently in capital expenditures. 
Our findings contribute to prior research along several dimensions. First, our study 
extends the capital investment and the management forecast literatures by considering the critical 
role played by managerial forecasting ability in both short-term earnings forecasting and long-
term capital investment decisions. Typically, the management forecast and investment literatures 
operate as distinct strands of research. Most of the prior capital investment literature focuses on 
the value created or destroyed by corporate capital investment and on whether firms’ level of 
capital investment falls in line with their investment opportunity set (Hubbard 1998; Stein 2003), 
whereas much of the prior management forecast research examines the determinants of 
management forecasting behavior and its consequences for capital markets (Hirst, Koonce, and 
Venkataraman 2008). These two research streams offer little discussion on whether the abilities 
related to capital budgeting or generating earnings forecasts extend to other managerial tasks. By 
highlighting the relation between managerial tasks that draw on common forecasting ability, our 
                                                 
3 See e.g., Fazzari et al. (1988), Wurgler (2000), Biddle and Hilary (2006), Richardson (2006), Whited (2006), 
Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2007), McNichols and Stubben (2008), and Biddle, Hilary, and Verdi (2009). 
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research identifies an observable proxy for the quality of internal project payoff forecasting. Our 
findings also suggest that, when studying the determinants and consequences of managers’ 
earnings guidance, researchers should regard the quality of earnings forecasts as a broader 
measure of forecasting ability and not simply as a means for providing information about 
managers’ expectations of next period earnings. 
Second, our findings may be relevant to market participants and regulators, as they 
inform the recent debate regarding the cessation of management earnings forecasts. Corporate 
professionals (Business Roundtable Institute for Corporate Ethics and CFA Institute Centre for 
Financial Market Integrity 2006) and some academics (Fuller and Jensen 2002) argue that 
managers should end the practice of providing quarterly earnings guidance because it induces 
myopic behavior by managers. However, proponents contend that guidance can better align 
external stakeholder expectations with those of management, thereby reducing information 
asymmetry. We provide empirical evidence suggesting that the quality of these forecasts can be 
used as a valuable measure of broader managerial forecasting ability related to investment. Thus, 
our findings point to an additional benefit of voluntarily disclosed forecasts that should be 
considered in the guidance cessation debate.4 
Third, our research provides greater insight into the nature of managerial ability. 
Trueman (1986) analytically shows that managers may be motivated to release earnings forecasts 
because it gives investors a more favorable assessment of the manager's ability to anticipate 
changes in the economic environment and to adjust investment decisions accordingly. However, 
there is little empirical evidence in the prior literature about whether managerial ability can be 
inferred from their earnings forecasts. We add to this literature by providing evidence consistent 
                                                 
4 Note that our findings do not imply that issuing guidance is optimal, or even encouraged, for all firms. Our 
findings only suggest that external stakeholders of firms that provide guidance may be able to draw inferences about 
management’s investing ability relative to that of managers of other firms that also provide earnings guidance. 
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with the notion that the quality of external management forecasts can serve as a measure of a 
broader forecasting ability related to investment decision inputs.5 
Finally, our paper contributes to the nascent literature that explores the relation between 
external disclosures and internal decision-making. For example, Hemmer and Labro (2008) 
provide analytical evidence that the properties of the financial reporting system affect the quality 
of the managerial accounting system, and thus the quality of corporate investment decisions. 
Similarly, Durnev and Mangen (2009), McNichols and Stubben (2008), Biddle et al. (2009), 
Bens, Goodman, and Neamtiu (2012), Badertscher, Shroff, and White (2013), Shroff, Verdi, and 
Yu (2013) and Shroff (2013) provide arguments and evidence linking external reporting to 
internal investment decisions. However, none of these studies examine the relation between 
managers’ voluntary disclosure quality and the quality of their internal investment decisions. 
Section II next discusses the motivation for the study. Section III describes the research 
design, descriptives, and results. Section IV discusses robustness tests, and Section V concludes. 
II. MOTIVATION 
In this section, we discuss the central role forecasting plays in the assessment of potential 
corporate investment projects. We also discuss why the quality of external managerial earnings 
forecasts may serve as a useful signal of managers’ internal forecasting ability.  
Forecasting and Corporate Acquisitions 
Corporate acquisitions typically require a large expenditure by the acquiring firm and a 
rigorous and thorough due diligence process. This process requires a deep understanding of: (i) 
the target value as a stand-alone business when operated by its current management; (ii) the 
                                                 
5 Note that there are many drivers of managerial ability related to leadership, communication, delegation, business 
acumen, etc. We focus on one particular aspect of managerial ability, i.e., forecasting ability, because it is directly 
related to both investment decisions and earnings forecasts.  
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value of potential synergies; and (iii) the maximum bid price the acquirer should pay. We expect 
each of these steps to be dependent on the manager’s earnings forecasting ability.6 
First, earnings forecasting ability plays a central role in valuing the target company. 
Practitioner resources (Eccles, Lanes, and Wilson 1999; Cullinan, Le Roux, and Weddigen 2004) 
and M&A textbooks (Copeland, Koller, and Murrin 2000) suggest that managers begin the 
acquisition valuation process by calculating the target’s stand-alone value. Copeland et al. (2000) 
indicate that the independent valuation of the target on a stand-alone basis should be the essential 
underpinning of any deal. Common valuation approaches include using a forward-looking 
price/earnings (P/E) multiple or a discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis, both of which rely 
heavily on earnings forecasts as inputs for the valuation (Chaplinsky, Schill, and Doherty 2006).7  
Second, once acquirers determine the stand-alone value of a target, they must determine 
the value of any synergies. Here again, managers must rely on their forecasting ability to 
estimate the synergies involved in an acquisition, which requires knowledge of the acquiring and 
target firms’ cost structures and revenue drivers. For example, a common type of synergy is cost 
savings from eliminating facilities and expenses that are no longer necessary when the two 
businesses are consolidated. Revenue enhancement synergies are also possible if the acquirer and 
the target achieve higher sales growth together than the firms could do operating on their own. 
Successfully forecasting these synergies requires a clear understanding of the firms’ economic 
environments and cost and revenue structures. Such an understanding is also central to 
successfully forecasting earnings.  
                                                 
6 For ease of exposition, we discuss the role of forecasting in three distinct steps. However, separating these steps, 
conceptually or empirically, is very difficult because they are unlikely to be independent.  
7 Successful capital budgeting decisions are those that generate cash receipts in excess of disbursements. Thus, it is 
reasonable to expect that managers forecast future cash flows to evaluate potential projects. However, over finite 
intervals, cash flows are not necessarily as informative as earnings because cash flows have timing and matching 
problems that cause them to be a ‘noisy’ measure of project performance. The purpose of earnings is to smooth 
transitory fluctuations in cash flows to better measure firm/project performance over finite intervals (Dechow 1994). 
Over the life of a project/firm, aggregate cash flows by definition equal aggregate earnings. For the purpose of our 
paper, we use both cash flows and earnings interchangeably to mean project payoffs. 
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Lastly, acquirers need to determine their maximum bid price. This price is a direct 
function of the target’s stand-alone value and the value of the potential synergies, making it 
dependent on forecasting ability as well. The extent to which the final offer price is close to the 
acquirer’s maximum bid price depends on how the allocation of gains from the business 
combination is negotiated between the acquirer and target (Grossman and Hart 1980).8 This 
negotiation process also depends on forecasting ability, making negotiating ability and 
forecasting ability complements, as effective negotiations are not possible unless the acquirer has 
clear insight into the value of the target. 
We note, however, that the acquisition process typically involves parties other than the 
acquirer and target. In particular, investment bankers frequently aid the acquirer in valuing the 
target firm and provide assistance in negotiating the deal price and other terms. Servaes and 
Zenner (1996) find that acquirers retain investment bank advisors when the deals are more 
complex and when the acquirer lacks prior acquisition experience. Although investment banks 
often play an advisory role in important phases of the acquisition, the ultimate responsibility for 
the acquisition valuation process and the final investment decision rests with the acquirer’s 
management. This view is supported by prior research (Lehn and Zhao 2006), which shows that 
the acquirer’s manager experiences elevated turnover probabilities following poor acquisitions. 
Forecasting and Capital Expenditures 
Capital expenditures, which typically require fewer resources than business acquisitions, 
are another common type of investment in real assets. We again expect forecasting ability to play 
a central role in capital expenditure decisions because the ability to better forecast each potential 
project’s future payoffs provides management with a more precise estimate of the project’s net 
present value. In fact, the same forecasting factors, such as a series of projected future payoffs, a 
                                                 
8 Exactly how much of the total estimated transaction value is transferred to the target depends in part on the relative 
bargaining power of the target and acquirer. If there is intense competition among multiple bidders for a target, the 
acquirer is likely to have less negotiating power (Jensen and Ruback 1983).  
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terminal value, etc., and valuation methods, such as DCF, are again applicable when valuing 
capital expenditures (Brennan 2003; Chaplinsky et al. 2006). 
There are, however, some differences with respect to forecasting between the acquisition 
and capital expenditure settings. For example, because capital expenditures typically reflect 
purchases of long-term assets that are related to existing operations, a manager’s ability to 
forecast her own firm’s earnings is likely to extend to forecasting the payoffs of the new assets. 
In contrast, acquisitions may involve targets in other industries or with different earnings 
generating processes, where a manager’s forecasting ability might not extend as readily. Capital 
expenditure decisions are also less likely to involve third parties, such as investment bankers, 
making the forecasting and valuation process more directly attributable to managers.9 Because of 
these differences, it is important to examine both acquisitions and capital expenditures to glean a 
more complete understanding of the role of managerial forecasting ability with respect to the 
quality of investment decision making. 
External Earnings Forecasts as a Proxy for Managerial Forecasting Quality 
Earnings represent a summary measure of the payoffs from past investments and are 
precisely what managers are interested in estimating when choosing among alternative 
investment projects (Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal 2005). Thus, managers likely draw on 
similar information and skills when generating external earnings forecasts and internal project 
payoff forecasts. If external earnings forecasts serve as a useful signal of managers’ forecasting 
ability with respect to the future returns from investments, we expect the quality of external 
forecasts to be associated with subsequent investment quality. Consistent with our argument, 
Trueman (1986) analytically demonstrates conditions under which management forecasts allow 
                                                 
9 Unfortunately, because individual capital expenditures are often of smaller magnitude than corporate acquisitions, 
there is less detail on the nature of the capital expenditure relative to acquisitions. This lack of detail makes it 
difficult to explore cross-sectional variation based on the types of the expenditures or to link expenditure decisions 
to subsequent outcomes, such as divestitures and impairments. 
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investors to better assess a manager’s ability to anticipate changes in the economic environment 
and adjust production plans accordingly. 
Managers’ forecasting ability is driven by two important factors: (i) the availability of 
high quality information regarding internal operations and the external environment, and (ii) 
their ability to process this information in developing forecasts. Supporting the argument that the 
ability to process information is important, Simon (1973, 270) argues that “…the scarce resource 
is not information; it is processing capacity to attend to information. Attention is the chief 
bottleneck…and the bottleneck becomes narrower…as we move to the tops of organizations…” 
Supporting the role of information systems in generating high quality forecasts, Feng, Li, and 
McVay (2009) find that managers of firms with material weaknesses in their internal control 
over financial reporting provide less accurate earnings forecasts. 
While we cannot disentangle the individual effects of information system quality and 
managerial forecasting ability, we note that information systems are designed and implemented 
by managers to aid them in making better operating decisions. Therefore, the quality of internal 
systems can be at least partly attributed to managerial ability. For example, Bamber, Jiang, and 
Wang (2010) suggest that managers who have earned an MBA degree, and thus have formally 
learned how to collect and process relevant information for forecasting, provide higher quality 
forecasts. Accordingly, we assume that the accuracy of management forecasts arises from both 
managers’ ability to obtain high quality information, by putting in place appropriate information 
systems, and their skill in processing and incorporating this information into their forecasts. 
Ex-ante, it is an open question whether external earnings forecasts can serve as a signal of 
managers’ internal forecasting ability with respect to investment for two reasons. First, the public 
dissemination of earnings forecasts may provide incentives for managers to engage in financial 
reporting manipulations or suboptimal investments to meet their own earnings targets (Fuller and 
Jensen 2002; Roychowdhury 2006; Cohen, Mashruwala, and Zach 2010), which would confound 
 11
the forecasting ability signal.10 For example, a manager may appear to have high quality external 
forecasts, but in reality the manager may have engaged in earnings management and actually has 
lower forecasting ability (Kasznik 1999). Alternatively, managers may have strong internal 
forecasting abilities, but strategically bias external forecasts to meet an objective other than 
forecasting accuracy, such as walking down analysts’ earnings expectations, misleading 
competitors, and manipulating their stock price for insider trading and/or compensation reasons 
(Cotter et al. 2006; Matsumoto 2002; Aboody and Kasznik 2000). Thus, the quality of the 
external forecasts may not capture the manager’s actual forecasting ability. On the other hand, 
both the ‘settling up’ of external forecasts and their recurring nature impose disciplinary and 
potential legal constraints on managers’ freedom to bias their expectations from their internal 
projections (Baginski, Hassell, and Kimbrough 2002). As such, it is unclear to what extent 
managers make substantive forecast adjustments from their actual expectations.  
Second, there are differences in the forecasting horizon between forecasting earnings and 
forecasting investment payoffs.  It is possible that the quality of external forecasts measures only 
short-term earnings forecasting ability, whereas the successful implementation of commonly 
used investment valuation methods, such as a DCF analysis, requires not only short-term, but 
also long-term earnings forecasting ability and terminal value estimates. Although these two 
forecasting tasks are distinct, we expect the quality of the two tasks to be positively related in 
that they rely on the manager’s ability to assess the external economic environment, their firm’s 
place in that environment, potential future changes in competition, demand, technology, 
production costs, etc., as well as the quality of the firm’s internal information systems. We 
                                                 
10 The above evidence also suggests that the act of providing management forecasts may lead to suboptimal 
investment decisions. For example, Cheng, Subramanyam and Zhang (2007) document that dedicated guiders 
engage in myopic R&D investment behavior relative to occasional guiders, which results in adverse effects on long-
term growth. Moreover, Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2005) find that managers pass up positive NPV projects to 
meet their earnings targets. Therefore, ceteris paribus, it is plausible that firm that issue earnings forecasts invest less 
efficiently than firms that do not forecast earnings. However, our interest lies in documenting variation in 
investment efficiency conditional on managers issuing earnings forecasts. 
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expect that short-term forecasting ability is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for long-
term forecasting ability. In other words, on average, we expect that managers who are unable to 
accurately forecast earnings in the short-term will also forecast poorly over longer horizons. 
 
III. RESEARCH DESIGN AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Managerial Forecast Quality Measure 
We use the quality of earnings forecasts to proxy for managerial forecast quality because 
earnings represent the aggregate payoffs from past investment decisions and because most other 
managerial forecasts are internal and not observable by outsiders. To assess the quality of 
management earnings forecasts, we focus on forecast accuracy following prior literature (Baik et 
al. 2011; Bamber et al. 2010; Feng et al. 2009; Hirst et al. 2008). Our intuition is that a manager 
who has a better understanding of the overall economic environment and her firm’s place in that 
environment should forecast more accurately and thus engage in better investment decisions. We 
use the absolute magnitude of forecast errors to measure forecast accuracy.11 
We collect information about management earnings forecasts and actual earnings per 
share (EPS) from First Call’s Company Issued Guidance (CIG) and the First Call’s Actuals 
databases. For each forecast, accuracy is measured as the absolute value of the difference 
between the management EPS forecast and the actual EPS, divided by the stock price. For range 
forecasts, we use the mid-point of the range following prior literature (e.g., Rogers and Stocken 
2005).12 We also follow prior literature (Rogers and Stocken 2005) and use annual, rather than 
                                                 
11 For example, suppose that both firm A and firm B have actual earnings of $1.00.  If firm A’s manager forecasts 
$1.01 and firm B’s manager forecasts $0.85, we argue that manager A (who is able to forecast closer to the actual 
realization) has better forecasting ability than manager B, even though manager A was optimistically biased in her 
forecast. Similarly, if manager A (B) forecasted $0.99 ($1.15), we would argue that manager A has better 
forecasting ability, even though she was conservatively biased in her forecast. That is, the sign of the forecast error 
is less relevant with respect to the manager’s ability to predict the actual earnings number. Further, we note that 
biases in forecasts may be correlated with agency problems that lead to inefficiency investment decisions. We 
address the role of agency problems in affecting investment efficiency in Section IV. 
12 Following prior research (e.g., Rogers and Stocken 2005), we remove open-ended forecasts because it is difficult 
to measure forecasting accuracy when we cannot unambiguously compare the forecast to the realized earnings. 
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quarterly, forecasts because they relate to earnings that are audited, and thus are less amenable to 
manipulation. To ensure that we do not include earnings pre-announcements and that we allow 
some time between the forecast announcements and earnings realizations, we require forecasts to 
be issued at least three weeks before the earnings announcement date. 
We calculate our forecast accuracy measure, Forecasting Accuracy, as the average 
accuracy for all annual forecasts issued in the three-year period before the investment decision 
(see Figure 1). We then multiply this average by negative one to transform it into an increasing-
in-quality measure. The long measurement window helps mitigate short-term effects that may 
bias forecast quality, including earnings management or short periods of forecasting ‘luck,’ both 
of which are unlikely to be sustainable (Hilary and Hsu 2011).  
The Relation between Forecasting Accuracy and Corporate Acquisition Quality 
In this section, we examine the relation between management forecasting quality and 
acquisition quality. We measure acquisition quality using an ex ante estimate of acquisition 
quality (i.e., acquisition announcement returns) as well as three ex post estimates of acquisition 
quality (i.e., post-acquisition change in operating performance, post-acquisition probability and 
magnitude of goodwill impairments, and post-acquisition probability of divestitures). 
 
Corporate Acquisition Announcement Return Analysis 
Following a large body of prior research (e.g., Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins 1983; Jensen 
and Ruback 1983; Lehn and Zhao 2006; Masulis et al. 2007; Francis and Martin 2010), we use 
the stock return around the acquisition announcement to proxy for the quality of the investment 
decision. This approach assumes that the market incorporates information in stock prices 
efficiently, so that the announcement return is an unbiased estimate of the impact of an 
acquisition on the wealth of acquiring-firm shareholders (Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz 
2004). Since almost all acquisitions of public companies are publicly announced in a salient 
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manner, the short window return is likely to capture the market’s assessment of the acquisition 
decision and is relatively less subject to misspecification than other measures of acquisition 
quality, such as long-window return measures (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). 
We collect our acquisition sample from the Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC) US 
Mergers and Acquisitions database. We identify acquisitions announced between January 1, 
1996 and December 31, 2008 that meet several criteria: (i) the acquirer is a US public company; 
(ii) the acquirer has annual financial statement information available from Compustat and stock 
return data from the CRSP Daily Stock Price and Returns file; (iii) the acquisition is completed. 
We retain only acquisitions that are at least five years apart for each firm. For firms engaging in 
multiple acquisitions within a five-year period, we retain only the first acquisition in this period. 
We impose this condition because prior literature finds strong evidence that (i) repeat acquirers 
have lower acquisition announcement returns for their later acquisitions than they do for their 
earlier acquisitions (Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller 2002; Conn, Cosh, Guest, and Hugues 2004; 
Ahern 2008; Ismail 2008) and (ii) management forecast accuracy is fairly stable overtime 
(Hutton and Stocken 2009).13 Therefore, when collectively viewed, these results suggest that we 
should not necessarily expect a relation between management forecast accuracy and the 
announcement returns for subsequent acquisitions undertaken in a series.14 
                                                 
13 Importantly, we also note that the reasons why repeat acquirers have lower announcement returns for later 
acquisitions are unlikely to be related to forecasting accuracy. Specifically, prior research identifies three potential 
reasons why repeat acquirers have declining announcement returns: (1) the opportunity set hypothesis, which 
predicts that the best targets are acquired first and worse targets later (Klasa and Stegemoller 2007); (2) the hubris 
hypothesis, which predicts that early success leads to managerial overconfidence and thus overbidding in later deals 
(Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll 2009); and (3) the agency hypothesis, which predicts that management interests become 
less aligned with shareholder interests as a firm matures. Thus, later deals may be made to generate private 
managerial benefits, not shareholder wealth gains (Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz 2004). Since it is a significant 
empirical challenge to fully control for all the reasons why we might observe lower announcement returns for later 
acquisitions by serial acquirers, the declining pattern observed in acquisition announcement returns contaminates the 
interpretation of forecast accuracy when we include all acquisition in our sample. 
14 In untabulated analyses, we find that our acquisition announcement test results are not robust to using the sample 
of all acquisitions. While we believe this result is to be expected given the patterns described above, we caution 
readers that our inferences do not hold for the sample of all acquisition announcements. 
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To test our prediction regarding the association between forecast quality and the quality 
of subsequent acquisitions, we use the following regression model: 
CAR t = γ0 + γ1Forecasting Accuracy [t-3, t-1] + γi CONTROLS + et, (1)
 
where CAR is the three-day cumulative abnormal return around the acquisition announcement 
and abnormal returns are measured using (i) the market model or (ii) the market-adjusted return, 
where Table 1 provides a detailed description of the variable construction approach.15 
Forecasting Accuracy is defined above, and we predict γ1 > 0. We cluster standard errors by 
four-digit SIC industry and fiscal period end to allow for residual correlation within an industry 
and fiscal period. Our regression model also includes industry and time fixed effects. 
CONTROLS is a vector of control variables measuring acquirer and acquisition 
characteristics as well as the overall uncertainty in the firm’s environment. With respect to 
acquirer characteristics that are likely to affect acquisition announcement returns, following prior 
research we control for Firm Size using the natural log of total assets, Tobin’s Q, the return on 
assets (ROA), sales growth (Growth), Leverage, and Stock Return. We measure all firm 
characteristics as of the last fiscal year end preceding the acquisition announcement. Tobin’s Q, 
ROA, Growth and Firm Size are associated with a firm’s growth opportunities and the 
availability of financing (Moeller et al. 2004; Dong et al. 2006). Leverage captures monitoring 
by creditors that may limit a firm’s ability to overinvest (e.g., Maloney et al. 1993; Masulis et al. 
2007). Finally, we control for the acquirer’s pre-acquisition Stock Returns because prior work 
(e.g., Rosen 2006) documents that an acquirer’s twelve-month stock return trailing the 
announcement date is a determinant of the acquisition announcement return. In addition, the 
management forecast literature finds that earnings forecast properties are a function of firm size 
(e.g., Ajinkya, Bhojraj, and Sengupta 2005), growth opportunities (e.g., Feng et al. 2009), 
                                                 
15 In untabulated analyses, we re-estimate our acquisition announcement test using the average daily abnormal return 
between the announcement date and the completion date, and Forecasting Accuracy is still positive and significant 
at the 1% level. 
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leverage (e.g., Hutton, Lee, and Shu 2012) and past stock returns (e.g., Gong, Li, and Wang 
2011). We include these controls to mitigate the concern of correlated omitted variables. The 
definitions of all our control variables are detailed in Table 1. 
In addition, we control for overall economic uncertainty to mitigate concerns that firms 
operating in environments with less uncertainty find it easier to forecast future earnings and 
expected future payoffs from their investment opportunities. That is, in a more certain 
environment, it is easier to both (i) forecast earnings and (ii) filter out poor investment decisions. 
In contrast, where there is more uncertainty, forecast errors will naturally be larger and firms will 
tend to make poorer investment decisions. Thus, instead of managers’ forecasting ability 
affecting both external forecast quality and the quality of their investment decisions, it could be 
general uncertainty that affects both. 
To mitigate the uncertainty concern, we control for Analyst Forecast Accuracy and 
Analyst Forecast Dispersion over the same period that we measure management forecast 
accuracy (Zhang 2006; Hutton and Stocken 2009).16 We also control for earnings and stock 
return volatility (Stdev. ROA; Stdev. Stock Returns) as well as Earnings Persistence (Hutton and 
Stocken 2009) to mitigate any potential residual effect of uncertainty on management forecast 
accuracy and investment quality. Finally, to the extent managers who operate in a more uncertain 
business environment are likely to issue a less precise forecast (i.e., issue wider range forecasts), 
we include a measure of Forecast Precision, calculated as the average precision of all forecasts 
issued in the three-year period prior to the investment decision. 
Next, we control for Forecast Horizon, measured as the natural log of the number days 
between the forecast announcement date and fiscal period end date. We use the average horizon 
                                                 
16 Hutton and Stocken (2009) use a relative accuracy measure computed as the manager’s forecast accuracy less the 
consensus analyst forecast accuracy. We decompose this measure and include each accuracy measure separately in 
the regression to allow the coefficients to vary. However, in untabulated analyses we find that our inferences are 
robust to using the relative accuracy measure.   
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of all forecasts issued in the three-year period before the investment decision. Forecast Horizon 
can play an important role in shaping accuracy, potentially influencing our inferences about 
managers’ forecasting ability drawn from observed accuracy. For example, an accurate forecast 
issued a year before the fiscal period end date signals a greater level of forecasting ability than an 
equally accurate forecast issued a month before the period end date. Consistent with this 
intuition, prior studies, such as Ajinkya et al. (2005) and Hutton et al. (2012), document that 
timelines is an important determinant of forecasting accuracy. 
Consistent with prior research, we also control for the target’s public status – Public 
Target (Chang 1998; Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller 2002). Private targets have concentrated 
ownership, and thus the owners of private targets become large shareholders of the acquirer so 
that they have incentives to monitor the management of the acquiring firm (e.g., Chang 1998). 
This is especially the case when the acquisition is entirely paid for using the acquirer’s stock. We 
control for whether the target is located in the same country as the acquirer, Domestic Target, 
following Moeller et al. (2004), and the method of payment, Cash M&A and Stock M&A, 
following Travlos (1987) and Moeller et al. (2004). We include Cash M&A in our regression 
because it is more likely that cash acquisitions are the result of free cash flow problems, as 
proposed by Jensen (1986) (see Shleifer and Vishny 1997). We control for Stock M&A because 
arbitrageurs put pressure on the stock price of the acquiring firm for 100% equity offers for 
public firms (Mitchell et al. 2004). We also control for Diversifying Acquisitions because prior 
research finds that diversifying acquisitions are a sign that managers are trying to build larger 
and more stable empires, and thus have lower announcement period returns (Morck, Shleifer, 
and Vishny 1990).  
We control for the size of the target relative to the acquirer, Relative Target Size, to adjust 
for the impact of an acquisition on the equity market capitalization of the acquiring firm. If a 
dollar spent on acquisitions has the same positive payoff, irrespective of the size of the 
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acquisition, the abnormal return should increase in the size of the target relative to the size of the 
acquirer (Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins 1983). Finally, we control for whether the acquisition 
was hostile, Hostile Takeover (Schwert 2000), and the number of bidders competing to acquire 
the target, No. of Bidders (Mitchell et al. 2004). We control for No. of Bidders, as competition 
among bidders increases the price paid by the acquirer, thereby lowering returns to acquiring-
firm shareholders (Moeller et al. 2004), and we control for Hostile Takeover, as Schwert (2000) 
finds that hostile acquisitions have lower abnormal returns than friendly acquisitions. 
Table 2 Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the variables in equation (1). The 
average acquisition announcement return is close to zero, which is consistent with prior research 
(Malmendier and Tate 2008; Bens et al. 2012). The interquartile range for both the Market 
Model CAR and the Market Adjusted CAR reveals that there is considerable variation in market 
responses (Q1 = -0.022, Q3 = 0.034), which is important, because our analysis examines whether 
variation in manager forecasting ability can explain cross-sectional variation in these 
announcement returns.17 Panel A also presents descriptive statistics of our main independent 
variable, Forecasting Accuracy, and the other management forecast characteristics. 
Table 2 Panel B reports the results from estimating equation (1). We find that the 
coefficient for Forecasting Accuracy is positive and significant with a t-statistic of 2.03 when 
announcement returns are measured using a Market Model CAR, and 1.90 using a Market Adjust 
CAR. This suggests that managers who generate more accurate forecasts make better acquisition 
decisions than managers who provide less accurate forecasts, which is consistent with our 
prediction.18 The coefficients for the control variables are signed consistently with those 
                                                 
17 Untabulated descriptive statistics indicate that no individual year contains more than 10% of our acquisition 
sample. In addition, there does not appear to be a time trend where the sample size is dramatically increasing or 
decreasing over time. 
18 An alternative explanation for our results is that some managers only provide external forecasts when fairly 
certain of outcomes and select only new investment projects with a high probability of success. This may lead to a 
positive association between forecast accuracy and investment quality in the cross-section that is unrelated to 
forecasting ability. To address this concern, we control for forecast frequency. Specifically, we add forecast 
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documented in prior research. For example, the coefficients for Firm Size and Tobin’s Q are 
negative and significant (Moeller et al. 2004), the coefficient for Diversifying Acquisition is also 
negative and significant (Morck et al. 1990), and the coefficient for Relative Target Size is 
positive and significant (Asquith et al. 1983). Finally, we also find that announcement returns are 
more negative for acquisitions of public targets (Chang 1998) and acquisitions completed by 
firms operating in uncertain environments, those firms with high Analyst Forecast Dispersion. 
 
Post-Acquisition Change in Operating Performance Analysis 
Next, we examine post acquisition accounting data to test for changes in operating 
performance following acquisitions. Specifically, we examine post-acquisition changes in the 
acquirer’s return on assets and cash flow from operations (Healy et al. 1992). Conceptually, we 
focus on both income before extraordinary items and cash flows because they represent the 
actual economic benefits generated by the assets. Since the level of economic benefits is affected 
by the assets employed, we scale both measures by the assets employed to form a return measure 
that can be compared across time and across firms. We examine the average post-acquisition 
performance in the three years following the acquisition completion. We employ the regression 
model described in equation (1), but change the dependent variable to the average change in the 
accounting based measures of performance from three years before the acquisition 
announcement to three years after the acquisition completion (see Figure 1, Panel B). Since we 
require three years of accounting data both pre- and post-acquisition, our sample size is reduced 
by roughly 30% from that used in the acquisition announcement analyses. Table 3, Panel A 
presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in these regressions. We note that our 
sample characteristics are very similar to those documented in Table 2, Panel A. 
Table 3, Panel B presents the results from these tests. We find that the coefficient for 
Forecasting Accuracy is positive and statistically significant when we use the Change in ROA 
                                                                                                                                                             
frequency as a control variable in the regressions presented in Table 2. Forecasting Accuracy remains statistically 
significant at the 1% in these untabulated tests.  
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and the Change in CFO as the operating performance measure. However, we note that when 
Change in ROA is the dependent variable, the coefficient for Forecasting Accuracy is at best 
marginally significant using a one-tailed test (one-tailed p-value = 0.058). These results suggest 
that firms with higher forecasting accuracy engage in more profitable acquisitions.  
 
Post-Acquisition Goodwill Impairment Analysis 
We next examine goodwill impairments as a measure of acquisition quality. Specifically, 
following recent studies, such as Doellman and Ryngaert (2010) and Gu and Lev (2011), we 
interpret goodwill impairment losses recorded in the post-acquisition period as an indication of a 
lower quality investment decision. Since goodwill represents the difference between what the 
acquirer pays for the target and the fair value of the target’s separable assets, impairment charges 
related to prior acquisitions’ goodwill represent cases where the premium paid above the value of 
the separable assets is no longer justified. While monitors, such as auditors, play a role in 
requiring firms to record goodwill impairments, managers also have significant discretion in the 
application of impairment rules (Ramanna and Watts 2011). However, we expect that a 
manager’s discretion would play a larger role in determining the amount of an impairment than 
in determining whether an impairment occurs. Accordingly, we examine both the probability and 
the magnitude of impairments in the three years following an acquisition.  
We expect that acquirers with higher pre-acquisition forecasting accuracy are less likely 
to record goodwill impairments in the post-acquisition period. We use the following logistic 
(OLS) regression model when the dependent variable is the existence (magnitude) of an 
impairment to test our prediction: 
Goodwill Impairment t = γ0 + γ1Forecasting Accuracy [t-3, t-1] + γi CONTROLS + et , (2)
where Goodwill Impairment is either (i) an indicator variable that takes a value of one (zero) if a 
firm records (does not record) an impairment following the acquisition, or (ii) the magnitude of 
the impairment. Forecasting Accuracy and CONTROLS are as defined as earlier. Figure 1, Panel 
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C provides a timeline of our variable measurement windows. Our regressions include year and 
industry fixed effects, and we cluster standard errors by industry and year. We estimate equation 
(2) using a sample of acquisitions that generate significant goodwill amounts, which we define as 
an increase in goodwill greater than or equal to 5% of total assets.19 To increase our sample size, 
and thus the test’s power, we retain all acquisitions that generate large goodwill increases, as 
opposed to retaining only the first deal in a series, as for the CAR analysis.20, 21  
Since our sample differs from that used in the previous analyses, Table 4, Panel A re-
tabulates the descriptive statistics for the goodwill sample. The descriptive statistics indicate that 
the characteristics of the firms included in the goodwill impairment test are similar to the 
characteristics of firms used in our acquisition announcement analysis. Firm Size, Return on 
Assets, Leverage, Growth, etc. have similar values in both tables. More importantly, the forecast 
characteristics are also very similar with a median Forecasting Accuracy of -0.013 in Table 2, 
Panel A, and -0.010 in Table 4, Panel A. 
Table 4, Panel B presents the results from estimating equation (2). We find that the 
coefficient for Forecasting Accuracy is negative and statistically significant across both 
specifications, consistent with our hypothesis that managers with high forecasting ability make 
better investment decisions.22 
                                                 
19 In sensitivity tests, our conclusions do not change when we rerun our analysis using 1% of total assets as a cut-off 
point for the magnitude of goodwill increases as well as when we use the full sample without any cut-off point.  
20 We use Compustat to identify our large goodwill generating acquisitions because this information is not available 
on SDC. However, a limitation of this approach is that we do not have transaction-specific characteristics for all the 
deals in this sample.  
21 Requiring both that the acquisition be first in the series and that there be at least a 5% increase in goodwill is not 
feasible. Using both criteria would reduce our sample size substantially because the first acquisitions are not 
necessarily those that create large goodwill increases. 
22 The accounting rules for goodwill impairments changed during our sample period with the implementation of 
SFAS 142 in 2001. Prior to SFAS 142, firms were required to amortize goodwill, and sufficiently high amortization 
could have reduced or eliminated goodwill impairments in the pre SFAS 142 period. In addition, SFAS 142 
increased the regularity of impairment testing. Taken together, these changes may increase the probability that, in 
the post SFAS 142 period, a firm whose goodwill is overvalued will record an impairment loss. Accordingly, we re-
estimate our goodwill impairment model using only observations after 2002, and our results do not change. 
Specifically, we continue to find that the coefficient for Forecasting Accuracy is negative and statistically 
significant at the 5% level. 
 22
Post-Acquisition Divestitures Analysis 
Prior studies, including Mitchell and Lehn (1990) and Francis and Martin (2010), suggest 
that post-acquisition divestitures indicate poorer acquisition decisions. The authors interpret the 
divestiture decision as evidence that acquisition strategies failed to increase and perhaps, 
decreased value. Therefore, we also measure the ex-post success of an acquisition by observing 
the likelihood of a subsequent divestiture. Our analysis of divestitures complements the goodwill 
impairment tests, because some firms will divest a poor acquisition rather than continue the 
operations of the acquired unit and incur an impairment charge. Assuming that post-acquisition 
divestitures are indicative of poor acquisition decisions, we expect that firms with greater pre-
acquisition forecasting quality are less likely to have a subsequent divestiture. We test this 
prediction using the following logistic regression model: 
Divestiture t = γ0 + γ1Forecasting Accuracy [t-3, t-1]  + γi CONTROLS + et, (3)
where Divestiture is an indicator variable that takes a value of one (zero) if an acquisition results 
in (does not result in) a subsequent divestiture.23 An acquisition is defined as having a 
subsequent divestiture if the target acquired at the acquisition date has the same four-digit SIC 
code as the unit divested in the three-year post-acquisition period. Forecasting Accuracy and 
CONTROLS are as defined as before. Figure 1, Panel C presents a timeline of our variable 
measurement windows. As with our earlier tests, our regressions include time and industry fixed 
effects, and we cluster standard errors by industry and year. 
Our sampling criteria for this analysis differs from that used in our prior analyses since 
we do not restrict the acquisitions to those that (i) generate large goodwill values, or (ii) are the 
first acquisition in a series. As a result, we re-tabulate the descriptive statistics for the divestiture 
sample in Table 5, Panel A. The removal of these restrictions results in a significantly larger 
                                                 
23 Using a continuous variable for our divestiture analysis is not feasible, as our SDC data source does not provide a 
dollar value for most of the divestitures. 
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sample with larger firms for our divestiture analysis. However, the properties of the managers’ 
forecasts and other firm characteristics are comparable across tables. 
Results in Table 5, Panel B for equation (3) show that the coefficient for Forecasting 
Accuracy is negative and statistically significant (z-statistic = -1.77), consistent with our 
prediction that firms with high forecast quality are less likely to engage in acquisitions that result 
in subsequent divestitures. Our results from examining both announcement returns as an ex ante 
measure of acquisition quality and three ex post measures of acquisition quality, changes in 
operating performance, goodwill impairments, and divestitures, provide consistent evidence that 
forecasting accuracy is associated with the quality of acquisition decisions.24 
 
Cross-sectional Tests: Forecasting Accuracy and Acquisition Quality 
We conduct two cross-sectional tests related to acquisition type based on the intuition 
that the transferability of an acquirer’s ability to forecast her own firm’s earnings to forecasting a 
target’s earnings is increasing in the similarities between the two firms. As managers acquire and 
process information about their industry’s prospects and other drivers of their investment 
payoffs, they can transfer this knowledge to aid in the valuation of (i) other firms in the same 
industry, and (ii) firms that have similar earnings generating processes. 
Following this intuition, we examine whether the relation between forecast quality and 
investment quality is weaker when the firm acquires a target in a different industry and stronger 
when it acquires a target with a similar earnings generating process. We identify similarities in 
firms’ earnings generating processes by examining the extent to which the acquirers’ stock 
                                                 
24 In untabulated analyses, we triangulate our evidence based on the ex ante and ex post measures of acquisition 
quality by examining the relation between acquisition announcement returns and post-acquisition changes in 
performance, goodwill impairments, and divestitures. Consistent with our expectations, we find that acquisition 
announcement returns are positively correlated with post-acquisition changes in performance, and negatively 
correlated with goodwill impairments and divestitures. However, the association between announcement returns and 
divestitures is statistically insignificant at conventional levels. 
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returns co-move with the targets’ industry returns.25 A measure based on changes in stock price 
is a natural choice for capturing similarities in the earnings generating process, since a firm’s 
stock price reflects the present value of its future earnings (Parrino 1997). If the acquiring firm 
and the firms in the target’s industry employ similar production technologies and operate in 
similar product markets, news concerning changes in factors such as economic conditions or 
technological innovations will tend to affect their cash flows, and therefore their stock prices, in 
a similar manner. Therefore, we estimate regressions of the acquiring firm’s stock returns on the 
market return index and the target’s industry return index. The partial correlation coefficient for 
the industry return index is used to proxy for similarities in the earnings generating processes of 
the target and acquirer; we call this measure Comovement. 
We predict that when the target and the acquirer are in different industries, the 
association between forecast quality and the acquisition announcement return will be weaker; 
when the acquirer and target have similar earnings generating processes, the association will be 
stronger. We test our predictions by including interaction terms between (i) Forecasting 
Accuracy and Diversifying Acquisition, an indicator variable for whether the acquirer operates in 
a different industry than the target, and (ii) Forecasting Accuracy and Comovement. 
The results in Table 6 show that the coefficient for Forecasting Accuracy x Diversifying 
Acquisition is negative and statistically significant (t-statistic = -2.09). As predicted, forecasting 
accuracy has a smaller effect on acquisition quality when firms acquire targets in different 
industries.26 Further, we find that the coefficient for Forecasting Accuracy x Comovement is 
                                                 
25 We use the target’s industry returns, as opposed to the target firm’s returns, because the majority of the targets in 
our sample are private, and publicly available returns are not available. 
26 Diversifying acquisitions and the associated announcement returns are interpreted as a type of merger for which 
there is an agency motivation, with managers seeking to build not only larger, but more stable empires (see e.g., 
Morck et al. 1990, Stein 2003). Accordingly, we control for the main effect of diversifying acquisitions on 
announcement returns. However, to the extent the interaction between Forecasting Accuracy and Diversifying 
Acquisitions captures any residual effect of such empire building motives, the interpretation of our results is 
problematic. To reduce concerns that such agency problems affect our inferences, we follow Hoechle, Schmid, 
Walter and Yermack (2012), who find that the negative announcement returns associated with diversifying 
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positive and statistically significant (t-statistic = 2.39), which suggests that forecasting ability has 
a greater effect on acquisition quality when the acquirer and target have similar earnings 
generating processes. These results help strengthen our inference that managerial forecasting 
quality is positively associated with the quality of their investment decisions. 
Capital Expenditure Analysis 
We next focus on capital expenditures, R&D expenditures, and advertising expenditures. 
To remain consistent with prior research, we examine capital expenditures separately and in 
conjunction with R&D and advertising expenditures (McNichols and Stubben 2008; Biddle et al. 
2009). To determine whether a firm’s investment levels deviate from expected investment levels, 
we use a benchmark investment model based on prior research on investment efficiency 
(McNichols and Stubben 2008; Biddle et al. 2009; Shroff 2013). Specifically, we calculate 
unexpected investment as the absolute value of the residual from industry-year regressions of a 
firm’s capital expenditures (or the sum of capital, R&D, and advertising expenditure) on lag 
Tobin’s Q, cash flows from operations, lag asset growth and lag investment. We predict that 
higher forecasting accuracy is associated with more efficient investment decisions. Because 
better investment choices are reflected as smaller deviations from expected levels, we multiply 
the absolute value of the residual by negative one to make our variable increasing in efficiency.27 
Although this model of investment is widely used in prior research, there is significant 
measurement error in this proxy for investment efficiency (Erickson and Whited 2000). 
                                                                                                                                                             
acquisitions are significantly weaker for firms with strong governance mechanisms, and verify that our inferences 
are robust to controlling for additional governance proxies (untabulated). 
27 In untabulated analyses, we attempt to validate our measure of investment efficiency by examining whether firms 
identified as investing more efficiently also have better future performance. Specifically, we examine the relation 
between our measure of investment efficiency and ex post performance using four proxies: (i) average ROA in the 
three years following the year we measure investment efficiency, (ii) aggregate earnings in the three years following 
the year we measure investment efficiency, scaled by assets in the year we measure investment efficiency, (iii) 
average cash flows from operations, scaled by assets in the three years following the year we measure investment 
efficiency, and (iv) aggregate cash flows from operation in the three years following the year we measure 
investment efficiency, scaled by assets in the year we measure investment efficiency. We find that our measure of 
investment efficiency is (significantly) positively related to all measures of future performance. 
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Therefore, we use an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the absolute value of a firm’s 
level of unexpected investment falls below the median absolute value of the unexpected 
investment distribution, and zero otherwise.28 We estimate a logistic regression of investment 
efficiency on Forecasting Accuracy and CONTROLS, as defined before. In addition to our 
standard set of control variables, we also include the standard deviation of capital expenditures 
(Stdev. Investment), as greater historical volatility decreases the probability that the deviation in 
investment in a period is small. Finally, our regression includes industry and year fixed effects, 
and we cluster standard errors by industry and year. Figure 1 Panel D shows a timeline of our 
variable measurement windows. 
Table 7, Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the 
investment efficiency analysis. Both measures of investment efficiency have a mean value of 
0.50 because we classify firms above (below) the median as investing efficiently (inefficiently).  
The forecasting characteristics are very similar to those reported in our earlier tables. For 
example, the median Forecasting Accuracy is -0.010 in both our investment efficiency sample 
(Table 7, Panel A) and our goodwill impairment sample (Table 4, Panel A). 
Table 7, Panel B presents our regression results. We find that the coefficient for 
Forecasting Accuracy is positive and statistically significant for both measures of investment 
efficiency. These results indicate that managers who have greater forecasting ability invest more 
efficiently in fixed assets, R&D, and advertising, as measured by the magnitude of unexpected 
investment amounts. Overall, our analyses of acquisitions and capital expenditure decisions 
provide consistent evidence that external management forecast quality acts as a measure of 
broader managerial forecasting ability regarding investment. Table 7, Panel B also shows that the 
coefficients for our control variables are consistent with expectations and prior research (e.g., 
Biddle et al. 2009). For example, larger firms and firms with higher leverage investment more 
                                                 
28 However, we note that our inferences are unchanged if we use the continuous measure of investment efficiency. 
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efficiently and firms operating in more uncertain environments (i.e., those with a higher Stdev. 
Investment and Stdev. ROA) invest less efficiently. 
IV. ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
Financial Reporting Quality 
Our evidence above suggests that earnings guidance can be used as a measure of a 
broader forecasting ability. However, managerial forecast quality could simply be one 
component of an overall disclosure policy of transparent, or ‘high quality,’ reporting, and thus 
serve as a proxy for better financial reporting quality. Several recent studies (Biddle and Hilary 
2006; McNichols and Stubben 2008; Biddle et al. 2009) find that firms with higher financial 
statement reporting quality have more efficient investment. These studies contend that high 
quality financial reporting can lead to more efficient investment via two mechanisms. First, 
transparent financial statements can help financially constrained firms attract capital by reducing 
information asymmetry between the firm and outside suppliers of capital. Second, higher quality 
financial accounting can lead to better monitoring, which reduces moral hazard related to 
overinvestment. Thus, we control for the effect of reporting quality on managerial investment 
decisions, and examine whether management forecasts provide incremental information. 
To capture financial reporting quality, we use a principal component analysis, where we 
extract a common factor from the following three reporting quality measures: (i) working capital 
accrual estimates in earnings, which is calculated as the sum of changes in accounts receivable, 
inventory, accounts payable, taxes payable and net changes in other accrued assets for the period, 
(ii) ‘abnormal’ accruals, which is calculated as the absolute value of the residuals from industry-
 28
level regressions of the McNichols (2002) abnormal accrual model, where only industries with at 
least 20 observations are included, and (iii) the FOG index following Li (2008).29 
In untabulated analyses, we find that our inferences are robust to including reporting 
quality as an additional variable in each of our regression models. The coefficient estimates for 
financial reporting quality are positive in all our analyses, and statistically significant in the 
goodwill and investment efficiency tests. This suggests that financial reporting quality is 
associated with better investment, consistent with findings in prior research. Overall, these 
results indicate that managerial forecast quality provides incremental information over and above 
the effects of financial reporting quality with respect to managerial investment decisions. 
Governance Measures 
As prior literature (Biddle et al. 2009) uses the quality of financial reporting as a measure 
related to agency costs, we supplement this analysis by including additional control variables that 
more directly measure incentive alignment and monitoring. In particular, we measure a firm’s 
governance characteristics using: (i) board size , (ii) percentage of independent directors on the 
board, (iii) audit committee size, and (iv) whether the CEO is also the chairman of the board. Our 
empirical analyses of acquisition returns, changes in post-acquisition performance, post-
acquisition divestitures and investment efficiency are robust to the inclusion of these controls. 
However, in our goodwill impairment test, we find that the coefficient for Forecasting Accuracy, 
although still negative, becomes weaker (one-tailed p-value = 0.11). We note, however, that this 
result seems primarily driven by the reduced sample size and not the inclusion of additional 
control variables. For these sensitivity tests, our sample size reduces by about 50% because we 
retain only observations that have sufficient information on RiskMetrics to compute the 
                                                 
29 Abnormal accrual models have been used extensively in the earnings quality literature. However, despite their 
prevalence, many have argued that there are considerable measurement error issues with the models (Dechow, Ge, 
and Schrand 2010). Because of these measurement error concerns, we use non-accrual based measures such as the 
FOG index as well to verify the robustness of our inferences. 
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governance variables. Using this restricted sample, we obtain the same results both when the 
governance variables are included in the model and when they are not included.  
We also measure managerial incentive alignment following Core and Guay (1999), where 
we calculate the change in a CEO’s equity portfolio for a 1% change in the stock price for the 
period before the investment decision. When estimating our models with CEO equity incentives 
as an additional control variable, our untabulated results are qualitatively similar to the results of 
the governance characteristic analysis described above. 
Selection Bias 
One potential concern with our analyses is that the provision of management earnings 
forecasts is an endogenous choice, which may bias our coefficient estimates. To mitigate this 
concern, we implement the Heckman two-stage procedure to correct for a potential self-selection 
bias. In the first stage, we model managers’ forecast issuance decision using a sample that 
includes both guiders and non-guiders. That is, we regress the indicator variable, Guide, on 
determinants of issuing guidance following prior literature (Lennox and Park 2006; Bamber at al. 
2010). Specifically, we use the following variables: firm size, earnings performance, growth 
opportunities, leverage, earnings volatility, analyst following, percentage of shares held by 
institutional investors, the amount of debt and equity finance raised in the capital markets, R&D 
intensity and two indicator variables identifying firms reporting losses and restructuring charges. 
Based on this first stage regression, we calculate the inverse Mills ratio and include it as an 
additional control variable in our regressions. We find that our inferences are unchanged after 
including the inverse Mills ratio as an additional control variable. 
Controlling for Forecasting Aggressiveness 
It is possible that some managers make aggressive earnings forecasts, that is forecasts 
that are higher than the realized earnings, and also aggressive investment payoff forecasts. As a 
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result, these managers undertake projects that would not pass their firm’s hurdle rate absent such 
high forecasted payoffs. To determine whether our results are driven by this potential relation 
between aggressive forecasts and poor investment outcomes, we conduct two tests. First, we redo 
our analyses controlling for whether the average signed forecast error for the three years prior to 
the investment date is positive, that is, forecasted earnings are higher than realized earnings. And 
second, we redo our analyses after controlling for the proportion of forecasts in the three years 
prior to the investment date that have positive forecast errors, i.e., the proportion of forecasts that 
are aggressive. We find that our inferences are unchanged in these analyses. 
Role of Range Forecasts 
One difficulty in measuring forecast accuracy for our sample is that some forecasts are 
range forecasts. Although we follow prior literature (Rogers and Stocken 2005) in using the 
midpoint of the range as the focal point, there is potential that this measurement adds noise, or 
perhaps even some bias. Accordingly, we run the following two tests. First, we recalculate 
average accuracy using only point forecasts, as opposed to point and range forecasts. Our results 
are qualitatively similar when we follow this approach. Second, following Ciconte, Kirk, and 
Tucker (2012), we recalculate average accuracy using the upper bound, as opposed to the mid-
point, of the range forecasts. The intuition is that managers face an asymmetric loss function 
regarding earnings surprises, whereby they are asymmetrically ‘punished’ for earnings 
realizations that are below the forecast. Accordingly, managers tend to provide their actual 
expectation near the top of the range to allow ‘more room for error.’ Our results are robust to this 
alternate specification as well. 
Prior Investment Quality 
Finally, we examine whether managerial forecast quality provides information that is 
incremental to lagged investment quality. That is, investors may use prior investment quality to 
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predict future investment quality. As such, guidance may not provide any incremental 
information. To address this issue, we include lagged investment quality for our non-market 
based measures: Goodwill Impairment, Divestitures and Investment Efficiency. Lagged 
investment quality is the average investment quality in the prior three years, similar to our 
approach for calculating Forecasting Accuracy in our main analyses. Specifically, for the 
goodwill impairment test, lagged investment quality is the likelihood of recording goodwill 
impairments in the three years before the acquisition of interest. In the divestiture test, lagged 
investment quality is the likelihood of having divestitures in the three years before the 
acquisition of interest. Finally, for our investment efficiency tests, lagged investment quality is 
the average annual deviations from expected investment levels in the three years before the 
investment period of interest. Across these tests, we find that, although lagged investment quality 
is predictive of future investment quality, as expected, our findings continue to hold.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Capital budgeting relies heavily on the ability of managers to estimate payoffs related to 
potential projects. Even though these forecasts are critical to firm value, most forecasts are 
internal and thus not directly observable by external stakeholders. This paper investigates 
whether the quality of voluntarily disclosed management forecasts predicts the quality of 
managerial investment decisions. We contend that managers with higher quality external 
management forecasts have stronger internal forecasting skills, which result in better estimation 
of investment project payoffs, and thus better investment decisions.  
Using the accuracy of managers’ external forecasts as a measure of managerial 
forecasting quality, we predict that management forecast quality is positively associated with 
acquisition announcement returns, post-acquisition changes in operating performance, and 
negatively related to post-acquisition goodwill write-downs and divestitures. We find evidence 
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consistent with these predictions. We also explore settings with significant variation in the extent 
to which managerial forecasting expertise extends to the valuation of other firms. We find that 
the association between management forecast quality and subsequent acquisition announcement 
returns is weaker in those settings where the target either is in the different industry or has a 
dissimilar earnings generating process. Finally, we predict and find a positive association 
between forecasting quality and investment efficiency in capital expenditures. 
Our study lies at the intersection of the investment and management forecast literatures. 
There is a dearth of evidence in the investment literature on whether managers’ proficiency at 
non-investment related tasks can be used to infer the quality of their investment decisions. 
Similarly, there is little evidence in the guidance literature on whether the abilities related to 
generating manager forecasts extend to other managerial tasks. We contribute to these literatures 
by providing evidence that forecasting ability is positively associated with the quality of 
investment appraisal. These findings suggest that short-term earnings forecasting and long-term 
capital investment decisions rely on common forecasting expertise, despite being distinct 
managerial tasks with different objectives and horizons.  
Our findings also inform the recent debate regarding the cessation of management 
earnings forecasts. Both corporate professionals and academics argue that managers should end 
the practice of providing quarterly earnings guidance. We provide empirical evidence suggesting 
that the quality of these forecasts can be used as a valuable measure of broader managerial 
forecasting ability regarding investment. Thus, our findings point to an additional benefit of 
voluntarily disclosed forecasts that should be weighted in the guidance cessation debate. 
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FIGURE 1 
This figure presents the timeline for measuring management forecasting accuracy (our independent variable of 
interest) relative to acquisition announcement returns, goodwill impairments, divestitures, and investment efficiency 
(our dependent variables). 
Panel A: Timeline for Measuring Forecast Accuracy relative to Acquisition Announcement Returns 
 
 
Panel B: Timeline for Measuring Forecast Accuracy relative to Changes in Operating Performance 
Measurement 
 
 
Panel C: Timeline for Measuring Forecast Accuracy relative to Goodwill and Divestiture Measurement 
 
 
Panel D: Timeline for Measuring Forecast Accuracy relative to Investment Efficiency Measurement 
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TABLE 1 
Variable Definitions 
This table provides a detailed description of the procedure used to compute each variable used in our analyses. The 
variables are listed in alphabetical order. 
Variable Definition 
Analyst 
Forecast 
Accuracy 
Analyst earnings forecasts accuracy is measured using the analyst earnings forecast issued 
immediately before the management earnings forecast date. For each analyst forecast, accuracy is 
measured as the absolute value of the difference between the forecasted EPS and the actual EPS 
divided by the stock price three days prior to the analyst forecast release date. 
Analyst 
Forecast 
Dispersion 
Analyst earnings forecast dispersion measured immediately prior to the management earnings 
forecast date. We scale dispersion by stock price three days prior to the management forecast date. 
Capital 
Expenditure 
Efficiency 
Indicator variable that takes a value of one if a firm has an unexpected investment level below the 
median of the distribution of unexpected investment and zero otherwise. unexpected investment is 
measured as the absolute value of the residual from a regression of a firm’s capital expenditures on 
lag Tobin’s Q, cash flows from operations, lag asset growth and lag capital expenditures. The 
regressions are estimated by industry and year for industries with at least 30 available observations. 
Capital + 
R&D + 
Advertising 
Expenditure 
Efficiency 
Indicator variable that takes a value of one if a firm has an unexpected investment level below the 
median of the distribution of unexpected investment and zero otherwise. unexpected investment is 
measured as the absolute value of the residual from a regression of a firm’s aggregate investment 
on lag Tobin’s Q, cash flows from operations, lag asset growth and lag aggregate investment. 
Aggregate investment is defined as capital expenditures plus R&D expenditures plus advertising 
expenditure. The regressions are estimated by industry and year for industries with at least 30 
available observations. 
Cash M&A Indicator variable that takes a value of one if a hundred percent of the consideration paid for the 
target consist of cash, zero otherwise. 
Change in 
CFO 
The average CFO over the years t+1 to t+3 minus the average CFO over the years t-3 to t-1, where 
year t is the acquisition year. CFO is measured as cash flow from operations divided by total assets. 
Change in 
ROA 
The average ROA over the years t+1 to t+3 minus the average ROA over the years t-3 to t-1, where 
year t is the acquisition year. ROA is measured as income before extraordinary items divided by 
total assets. 
Comovement 
The partial correlation coefficient for the industry return index obtained from regressions of the 
acquiring firm’s monthly stock returns on the monthly market return index and the target’s monthly 
industry return index. The regressions are estimated over the three-year period prior to the 
acquisition announcement date. We standardize the variable to have a mean zero and standard 
deviation of one to ease the interpretation of the interaction term in our cross-section test. 
Diversifying 
Acquisition 
Indicator variable that takes a value of one if the target and acquirer have different two-digit SIC 
industry code, zero otherwise. 
Divestiture 
Indicator 
Indicator variable that takes a value of one (zero) if an acquisition has (does not have) a subsequent 
divestiture during the three years following the acquisition. An acquisition is defined as having a 
subsequent divestiture if the target acquired at the acquisition date has the same four-digit SIC code 
as the firm divested during the three-year post-acquisition period. 
Domestic 
Target Indicator variable that takes a value of one if the target is a domestic company, zero otherwise. 
Earnings 
Persistence 
First-order autocorrelation in quarterly earnings before extraordinary items in the three-year period 
prior to the investment date/period. 
Firm Size Natural log of total assets at the end of the fiscal year preceding the investment date/period. 
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Forecasting 
Accuracy 
Average accuracy of all annual management forecasts issued in the three years prior to the 
investment date/period (for acquisitions and capital expenditures, respectively). For each forecast, 
accuracy is measured as the absolute value of the difference between the management forecasted 
EPS minus the actual EPS divided by the stock price three days prior to the management forecast 
release date. The management forecast is either a point estimate or the mid-point of a range 
estimate of a firm’s annual earnings. Accuracy is multiplied by minus one to transform it in an 
increasing-in-quality measure. 
Forecast 
Horizon 
Average forecast horizon of all annual management forecasts issued in the three-year period prior 
to the investment announcement. For each forecast, forecast horizon is measured as the natural log 
of the number days between the forecast announcement date and the fiscal period end date. 
Forecast 
Precision 
Average precision of all annual management forecasts issued in the three-year period prior to the 
investment date/period. For each forecast, precision is measured as the absolute value of the 
difference between the upper bound of the management forecast minus the lower bound divided by 
the stock price three days prior to the management forecast release date. For a point forecast, the 
upper and lower bounds of the forecast range will be equal. Precision is multiplied by minus one to 
transform it in an increasing-in-precision measure. 
Goodwill 
Impairment 
Indicator 
Indicator variable that takes a value of one (zero) if a firm records (does not record) goodwill 
impairment losses in the three-year period following an acquisition that generates a large increase 
in goodwill. A large increase in goodwill is defined as an increase in goodwill greater or equal to 
5% of total assets. 
Goodwill 
Impairment 
Loss 
The magnitude of goodwill impairment losses recorded in the three-year period following an 
acquisition that generates a large increase in goodwill. A large increase in goodwill is defined as an 
increase in goodwill greater or equal to 5% of total assets. 
Growth Percentage change in sales in the fiscal year preceding the investment date/period. 
Hostile 
Takeover 
Indicator variable that takes a value of one if the acquisition was classified as hostile in the SDC 
database, zero otherwise. 
Leverage Leverage computed as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets at the end of the fiscal year 
preceding the investment date/period. 
Market 
Adjusted CAR 
Three-day cumulative abnormal return around the acquisition announcement. The abnormal return 
is computed as the stock return minus the return to the CRSP value-weighted index over the three 
day announcement window. 
Market Model 
CAR 
Three-day cumulative abnormal return around the acquisition announcement. The abnormal return 
is computed using the market model, where the parameters of the model are estimated over the 
window (-271,-21) trading days preceding the acquisition announcement and the market return is 
measured as the return to the CRSP value-weighted index. 
No. of 
Bidders 
Indicator variable that takes a value of one if there is more than one bidder for the target firm, zero 
otherwise. 
Public Target Indicator variable that takes a value of one if the target is a public company, zero otherwise. 
Relative 
Target Size Ratio of the acquisition transaction value to the acquirer’s market value. 
Return on 
Assets (ROA) 
Income before extraordinary items divided by lag total assets for the fiscal year preceding the 
investment date/period. 
Stdev. ROA Standard deviation of quarterly ROA over the three years prior to the investment date/period. 
Stdev. Stock 
Returns 
Standard deviation of the daily buy-and-hold stock returns measured over the one-year period prior 
to the investment date/period. 
Stock M&A Indicator variable that takes a value of one if a hundred percent of the consideration paid for the 
target consist of the acquirer’s stock, zero otherwise. 
Stock Returns 
Buy and hold stock return in the fiscal year preceding the investment date/period. For the 
acquisition announcement analysis, the buy and hold return is measured over the period (-13,-1) 
month relative to the acquisition announcement. 
Tobin’s Q Market value of equity plus the book value of short and long term debt scaled by total assets 
measured at the end of the fiscal year preceding the investment date/period. 
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TABLE 2 
Acquisition Announcement Returns and Management Forecast Accuracy 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of the Variables in our Regression Analyses of Acquisition Announcement Returns 
(N = 948) 
  Mean Std Q1 Median Q3 
ACQUISITION QUALITY 
Market Model CAR 0.007 0.065 -0.022 0.005 0.034 
Market Adjusted CAR 0.006 0.064 -0.024 0.003 0.033 
FORECAST CHARACTERISTICS 
Forecasting Accuracy -0.024 0.031 -0.031 -0.013 -0.004 
Forecast Precision -0.003 0.003 -0.004 -0.002 0.000 
Forecast Horizon 5.329 0.552 5.149 5.455 5.676 
ACQUIRER CHARACTERISTICS 
Firm Size 6.640 1.796 5.347 6.501 7.776 
Return on Assets 0.048 0.087 0.017 0.051 0.092 
Tobin's Q 2.274 1.645 1.236 1.677 2.691 
Leverage 0.508 0.239 0.307 0.522 0.671 
Growth 0.182 0.394 0.010 0.097 0.236 
Stock Returns 0.244 0.567 -0.095 0.159 0.425 
UNCERTAINTY 
Stdev. ROA 0.019 0.028 0.005 0.010 0.021 
Stdev. Stock Returns 0.028 0.013 0.018 0.025 0.033 
Earnings Persistence 0.117 0.304 -0.094 0.089 0.337 
Analyst Forecast Accuracy -0.009 0.015 -0.010 -0.004 -0.002 
Analyst Forecast Dispersion 0.003 0.009 0.001 0.001 0.003 
ACQUISITION CHARACTERISTICS 
Public Target 0.204 0.403 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Domestic Target 0.816 0.387 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Cash M&A 0.348 0.477 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Stock M&A 0.072 0.258 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Diversifying Acquisition 0.434 0.496 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Relative Target Size 0.156 0.245 0.020 0.063 0.168 
Hostile Takeover 0.021 0.144 0.000 0.000 0.000 
No. of Bidders 0.008 0.092 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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TABLE 2 (continued) 
Panel B: Analyses of Acquisition Announcement Returns and Management Forecast Accuracy 
Dependent Variable = Acquisition Announcement Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) 
  Predicted Sign Market Model CAR Market Adjusted CAR 
    Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic
FORECAST CHARACTERISTICS 
Forecasting Accuracy + 0.144 ** 2.03 0.127 ** 1.90 
Forecast Precision 1.046 1.17 1.087 1.22 
Forecast Horizon 0.003 0.70 0.003 0.63 
ACQUIRER CHARACTERISTICS 
Firm Size -0.004 ** -1.98 -0.004 ** -2.06 
Return on Assets 0.023 0.82 0.021 0.83 
Tobin's Q -0.005 ** -2.55 -0.005 ** -2.64 
Leverage 0.015 0.85 0.012 0.67 
Growth -0.004 -0.36 -0.003 -0.31 
Stock Returns 0.005 1.35 -0.001 -0.17 
UNCERTAINTY 
Stdev. ROA 0.058 0.31 0.065 0.35 
Stdev. Stock Returns 0.029 0.20 -0.111 -0.95 
Earnings Persistence -0.006 -0.68 -0.004 -0.53 
Analyst Forecast Accuracy 0.072 0.40 0.079 0.42 
Analyst Forecast Dispersion -0.450 ** -2.47 -0.429 ** -2.51 
ACQUISITION CHARACTERISTICS 
Public Target -0.019 *** -3.57 -0.020 *** -3.76 
Domestic Target 0.009 1.08 0.008 1.03 
Cash M&A 0.001 0.12 0.000 -0.01 
Stock M&A -0.005 -0.53 -0.005 -0.61 
Diversifying Acquisition -0.006 * -1.70 -0.006 ** -2.24 
Relative Target Size 0.029 ** 2.53 0.032 ** 2.62 
Hostile Takeover 0.013 1.20 0.018 1.49 
No. of Bidders -0.020 -0.85 -0.020 -0.88 
N 948 948 
R-Sq. 15.2% 14.8% 
Year & Industry Indicators Yes Yes 
S.E. Clustered by Industry & Year   Yes Yes 
 
Panel A in this table presents descriptive characteristics of the variables used in the acquisition announcement return 
analyses. Panel B reports results from an OLS regression of the market reaction to the acquisition announcement on 
management forecast accuracy and control variables. Table 1 provides our variable definitions. In Panel B, *, **, 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively, using a one-tailed test when a prediction is 
indicated and a two-tailed test otherwise. 
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TABLE 3 
Analyses of Post-Acquisition Change in Operating Performance and Management Forecast Accuracy 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of the Variables in our Analyses of Post-Acquisition Operating Performance 
(N=668) 
  Mean Std Q1 Median Q3 
ACQUISITION QUALITY 
Change in ROA -0.025 0.122 -0.052 -0.007 0.018 
Change in CFO -0.004 0.085 -0.039 -0.005 0.034 
FORECAST CHARACTERISTICS 
Forecasting Accuracy -0.025 0.030 -0.033 -0.014 -0.004 
Forecast Precision -0.002 0.003 -0.003 -0.001 0.000 
Forecast Horizon 5.308 0.576 5.066 5.440 5.684 
ACQUIRER CHARACTERISTICS 
Firm Size 6.566 1.784 5.299 6.347 7.634 
Return on Assets 0.048 0.091 0.018 0.053 0.092 
Tobin's Q 2.348 1.728 1.249 1.712 2.814 
Leverage 0.504 0.234 0.307 0.522 0.666 
Growth 0.187 0.382 0.013 0.107 0.257 
Stock Returns 0.253 0.604 -0.119 0.160 0.448 
UNCERTAINTY 
Stdev. ROA 0.019 0.027 0.006 0.011 0.021 
Stdev. Stock Returns 0.028 0.013 0.019 0.026 0.035 
Earnings Persistence 0.119 0.307 -0.095 0.087 0.349 
Analyst Forecast Accuracy -0.010 0.018 -0.010 -0.004 -0.001 
Analyst Forecast Dispersion 0.003 0.005 0.000 0.001 0.003 
ACQUISITION CHARACTERISTICS 
Public Target 0.193 0.395 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Domestic Target 0.820 0.384 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Cash M&A 0.329 0.470 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Stock M&A 0.075 0.263 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Diversifying Acquisition 0.433 0.496 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Relative Target Size 0.158 0.247 0.018 0.063 0.182 
Hostile Takeover 0.021 0.143 0.000 0.000 0.000 
No. of Bidders 0.010 0.102 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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TABLE 3 (continued) 
Panel B: Analyses of Post-Acquisition Operating Performance and Management Forecast Accuracy 
Dependent Variable = Post Acquisition Change in Performance 
  Pr. Sign Change in ROA Change in CFO 
    Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic
FORECAST CHARACTERISTICS 
Forecasting Accuracy + 0.247 * 1.57 0.271 ** 1.71 
Forecast Precision -1.880 -0.96 0.250 0.16 
Forecast Horizon -0.002 -0.21 0.004 0.75 
ACQUIRER CHARACTERISTICS 
Firm Size 0.001 0.17 0.002 0.78 
Return on Assets -0.422 *** -4.84 -0.248 *** -3.46 
Tobin's Q -0.006 -1.36 -0.006 ** -2.07 
Leverage 0.013 0.43 -0.008 -0.32 
Growth -0.026 -1.57 0.009 0.69 
Stock Returns 0.030 ** 2.31 0.015 ** 2.05 
UNCERTAINTY 
Stdev. ROA 1.032 ** 2.63 0.750 *** 2.68 
Stdev. Stock Returns -1.515 *** -3.37 -0.233 -0.70 
Earnings Persistence 0.002 0.10 0.007 0.55 
Analyst Forecast Accuracy 0.383 0.60 0.350 0.58 
Analyst Forecast Dispersion -4.023 -1.36 -0.968 -0.35 
ACQUISITION CHARACTERISTICS 
Public Target 0.001 0.07 0.004 0.38 
Domestic Target -0.010 -0.97 -0.007 -0.71 
Cash M&A -0.015 -1.34 -0.010 -1.37 
Stock M&A -0.028 -1.16 -0.013 -0.71 
Diversifying Acquisition -0.001 -0.07 0.004 0.57 
Relative Target Size -0.017 -1.02 0.002 0.18 
Hostile Takeover 0.027 1.10 -0.002 -0.09 
No. of Bidders -0.009 -0.34 0.006 0.33 
N 668 638 
R-Sq. 27.7% 24.5% 
Year & Industry Indicators Yes Yes 
S.E. Clustered by Industry & Year   Yes Yes 
 
Panel A in this table presents descriptive characteristics of the variables used in the analyses of post-acquisition 
changes in operating performance. Panel B reports results from OLS regressions of changes in post-acquisition 
operating performance on management forecast accuracy and control variables. Table 1 provides our variable 
definitions. In Panel B, *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively, using a one-tailed 
test when a prediction is indicated and a two-tailed test otherwise. 
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TABLE 4 
Post-Acquisition Goodwill Impairments and Management Forecast Accuracy 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Variables used in our Analyses of Post-Acquisition Goodwill Impairments (N=1,399) 
  Mean Std Q1 Median Q3 
Goodwill Impairment Indicator 0.277 0.447 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Goodwill Impairment Loss 0.030 0.079 0.000 0.000 0.002 
Forecasting Accuracy -0.019 0.032 -0.024 -0.010 -0.004 
Forecast Precision -0.003 0.003 -0.004 -0.002 -0.001 
Forecast Horizon 5.438 0.411 5.342 5.505 5.652 
Firm Size 6.610 1.515 5.563 6.512 7.582 
Return on Assets 0.061 0.073 0.038 0.067 0.094 
Book-to-Market 0.402 0.237 0.239 0.354 0.522 
Leverage 0.450 0.199 0.281 0.458 0.590 
Growth 0.219 0.320 0.057 0.152 0.285 
Stock Returns 0.307 0.689 -0.062 0.176 0.475 
Stdev. ROA 0.027 0.041 0.007 0.013 0.028 
Stdev. Stock Returns 0.028 0.013 0.019 0.025 0.034 
Earnings Persistence 0.146 0.293 -0.058 0.115 0.359 
Analyst Forecast Accuracy -0.005 0.008 -0.006 -0.003 -0.001 
Analyst Forecast Dispersion 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.002 
 
Panel B: Logistic and OLS Analyses of Post-Acquisition Goodwill Impairments and Management Forecast Accuracy 
Dependent Variable = Indicator Variable for Goodwill Impairment or the Magnitude of the Impairment 
  Pr. Sign P(Goodwill Impairment) 
Magnitude of Goodwill 
Impairment Loss 
    Marginal Effect z-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
Forecasting Accuracy - -0.668 ** -1.99 -0.329 ** -2.16 
Forecast Precision -3.433 -0.75 -0.202 -0.16 
Forecast Horizon -0.020 -0.70 -0.008 -1.54 
Firm Size 0.013 0.78 0.000 -0.09 
Return on Assets -0.055 -0.32 0.041 1.30 
Book-to-Market 0.143 ** 2.37 0.018 1.16 
Leverage 0.076 0.79 -0.030 * -1.92 
Growth 0.064 1.52 0.016 * 1.83 
Stock Returns -0.026 -1.38 -0.006 -1.41 
Stdev. ROA 0.335 * 1.68 0.065 1.54 
Stdev. Stock Returns 2.755 ** 2.52 0.915 *** 2.83 
Earnings Persistence -0.042 -1.26 -0.006 -1.09 
Analyst Forecast Accuracy -0.517 -0.26 0.422 1.16 
Analyst Forecast Dispersion -5.780 -1.03 0.049 0.04 
N 1,399 1,399 
Pseudo R-Sq. / R-Sq. 8.0% 14.2% 
Year & Industry Indicators Yes Yes 
S.E. Clustered by Industry & Year   Yes Yes 
 
Panel A in this table presents descriptive characteristics of the variables used in our analyses. Panel B reports results 
from a Logistic regression and OLS regression analyses. Table 1 provides our variable definitions. In Panel B, *, **, 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively, using a one-tailed test when a prediction is 
indicated and a two-tailed test otherwise. 
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TABLE 5 
Post-Acquisition Divestitures and Management Forecast Accuracy 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of the Variables used in our Analyses of Post-Acquisition Divestitures (N=5,051) 
  Mean Std Q1 Median Q3 
Divestiture Indicator 0.188 0.390 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Forecasting Accuracy -0.021 0.027 -0.028 -0.012 -0.004 
Forecast Precision -0.002 0.003 -0.003 -0.001 0.000 
Forecast Horizon 5.408 0.479 5.283 5.495 5.680 
Firm Size 7.370 1.874 6.046 7.236 8.557 
Return on Assets 0.048 0.076 0.019 0.052 0.085 
Book-to-Market 0.420 0.263 0.233 0.366 0.541 
Leverage 0.524 0.221 0.358 0.529 0.671 
Growth 0.217 0.365 0.040 0.129 0.284 
Stock Returns 0.228 0.515 -0.068 0.151 0.393 
Stdev. ROA 0.018 0.029 0.004 0.008 0.018 
Stdev. Stock Returns 0.026 0.012 0.017 0.023 0.031 
Earnings Persistence 1.572 0.655 1.069 1.614 2.054 
Analyst Forecast Accuracy -0.008 0.033 -0.008 -0.003 -0.001 
Analyst Forecast Dispersion 0.002 0.009 0.000 0.001 0.002 
 
Panel B: Analyses of Post-Acquisition Divestitures and Management Forecast Accuracy 
Dependent Variable = Probability of Post-Acquisition Divestiture 
  Predicted Sign Marginal Effect z-Statistic 
Forecasting Accuracy - -0.543 ** -1.77 
Forecast Precision 6.701 ** 2.32 
Forecast Horizon 0.016 0.81 
Firm Size 0.061 *** 10.98 
Return on Assets -0.106 -1.01 
Book-to-Market 0.018 0.55 
Leverage -0.057 -1.08 
Growth 0.018 1.05 
Stock Returns -0.005 -0.49 
Stdev. ROA 0.092 0.72 
Stdev. Stock Returns 0.665 0.80 
Earnings Persistence 0.011 1.12 
Analyst Forecast Accuracy -0.863 ** -2.27 
Analyst Forecast Dispersion 0.325 0.49 
N 5,051 
Pseudo R-Sq. 14.8% 
Year & Industry Indicators Yes 
S.E. Clustered by Industry & Year   Yes 
 
Panel A in this table presents descriptive characteristics of the variables used in the post-acquisition divestiture 
analyses. Panel B reports results from a Logistic regression of the probability of divestiture post acquisition on 
management forecast accuracy and control variables. Table 1 provides our variable definitions. In Panel B, *, **, 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively, using a one-tailed test when a prediction is 
indicated and a two-tailed test otherwise. 
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TABLE 6 
Cross-Section Test for Acquisitions Announcement Returns and Management Forecasting Accuracy 
 
Dependent Variable = Acquisition Announcement CAR 
  Pr. Sign Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic
FORECAST CHARACTERISTICS 
Forecasting Accuracy + 0.296 *** 2.81 0.135 ** 2.16 
Diversifying Acquisition -0.012 ** -1.96 -0.007 -1.50 
Forecasting Accuracy × Diversifying Acq. - -0.423 ** -2.09 --- --- 
Comovement --- --- 0.000 -0.15 
Forecasting Accuracy × Comovement + --- --- 0.123 *** 2.39 
Forecast Precision 1.050 1.45 1.033 1.38 
Forecast Horizon 0.002 0.62 0.002 0.53 
ACQUIRER CHARACTERISTICS 
Firm Size -0.004 ** -2.00 -0.004 * -1.77 
Return on Assets 0.017 0.69 0.021 0.85 
Tobin's Q -0.005 ** -2.50 -0.004 ** -2.33 
Leverage 0.011 0.75 0.013 0.74 
Growth -0.004 -0.42 -0.003 -0.24 
Stock Returns 0.006 1.28 0.007 1.37 
UNCERTAINTY 
Stdev. ROA 0.083 0.49 0.055 0.33 
Stdev. Stock Returns -0.051 -0.19 -0.022 -0.08 
Earnings Persistence -0.005 -0.57 -0.006 -0.66 
Analyst Forecast Accuracy 0.089 0.45 0.068 0.32 
Analyst Forecast Dispersion -0.545 *** -3.71 -0.413 *** -3.23 
ACQUISITION CHARACTERISTICS 
Public Target -0.018 ** -2.63 -0.018 ** -2.46 
Domestic Target 0.010 1.49 0.010 1.20 
Cash M&A 0.000 0.02 0.001 0.26 
Stock M&A -0.006 -0.54 -0.006 -0.53 
Relative Target Size 0.030 *** 3.20 0.029 *** 3.01 
Hostile Takeover 0.013 1.33 0.011 0.95 
No. of Bidders -0.015 -0.78 -0.022 -1.06 
N 948 889 
R-Sq. 15.5% 15.7% 
Year & Industry Indicators Yes Yes 
S.E. Clustered by Industry & Year   Yes Yes 
 
This table presents the results from an OLS regression of acquisition announcement returns on management forecast 
accuracy, an interaction between management forecast accuracy and (i) an indicator variable for acquisitions within 
the same industry and (ii) comovement between the acquirer’s stock returns and target’s industry stock returns and 
control variables. Table 1 provides our variable definitions. In Panel B, *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level respectively, using a one-tailed test when a prediction is indicated and a two-tailed test otherwise. 
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TABLE 7 
Investment Efficiency Analyses 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of the Variables in our Regression Analyses of Investment Efficiency (N=9,999) 
  Mean Std Q1 Median Q3 
Capital Expenditure Efficiency 0.503 0.500 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Capital + R&D + Advertising Exp. Efficiency 0.500 0.500 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Forecasting Accuracy -0.023 0.039 -0.026 -0.010 -0.004 
Forecast Precision -0.006 0.231 -0.004 -0.002 -0.001 
Forecast Horizon 5.315 0.433 5.191 5.375 5.543 
Firm Size 6.991 1.796 5.698 6.884 8.189 
Return on Assets 0.042 0.106 0.020 0.050 0.087 
Book-to-Market 0.513 0.463 0.259 0.424 0.648 
Leverage 0.524 0.229 0.358 0.532 0.673 
Stock Returns 0.123 0.576 -0.212 0.055 0.323 
Stdev. ROA 0.021 0.042 0.005 0.010 0.022 
Stdev. Investment 0.022 0.023 0.009 0.016 0.027 
Stdev. Stock Returns 0.029 0.015 0.019 0.026 0.036 
Earnings Persistence 0.110 0.286 -0.084 0.078 0.312 
Analyst Forecast Accuracy -0.011 0.048 -0.009 -0.004 -0.001 
Analyst Forecast Dispersion 0.002 0.006 0.000 0.001 0.002 
 
Panel B: Analyses of Investment Efficiency and Management Forecast Accuracy 
Dependent Variable = Investment Efficiency 
  Pr. Sign Capital Expenditure Efficiency Capital + R&D + Advertising Expenditure Efficiency 
    Marginal Effect z-Statistic Marginal Effect z-Statistic
Forecasting Accuracy + 0.317 ** 2.44 0.346 ** 1.84 
Forecast Precision -1.644 -1.38 0.703 0.56 
Forecast Horizon 0.032 ** 2.58 0.006 0.40 
Firm Size 0.030 *** 4.85 0.017 *** 3.20 
Return on Assets -0.133 ** -2.33 0.046 0.61 
Book-to-Market 0.044 *** 2.84 0.121 *** 6.41 
Leverage 0.084 ** 2.06 0.271 *** 6.60 
Stock Returns -0.005 -0.46 -0.003 -0.21 
Stdev. ROA -0.040 -0.27 -0.955 *** -4.06 
Stdev. Investment -6.586 *** -11.34 -3.244 *** -9.10 
Stdev. Stock Returns -0.124 -0.16 -0.827 -1.15 
Earnings Persistence 0.010 0.57 -0.074 *** -4.22 
Analyst Forecast Accuracy 0.104 1.41 -0.178 -1.20 
Analyst Forecast Dispersion -0.946 -1.04 -1.898 -1.54 
N 9,999 9,993 
Pseudo R-Sq. 8.0% 6.3% 
S.E. Clustered by Industry & Year   Yes Yes 
 
Panel A in this table presents descriptive characteristics of the variables used in the investment efficiency analyses. 
Panel B reports results from Logistic regressions of an indicator variable for firm-years classified as investing 
efficiently on management forecast accuracy and control variables. Table 1 provides our variable definitions. In 
Panel B, *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively, using a one-tailed test when a 
prediction is indicated and a two-tailed test otherwise. 
 
